

GETTING TO THE SOUL OF INCIDENT RESPONSE



Attacks on Software Publishing Infrastructure and Windows Detection Capabilities

Imran Islam & Dave Jones June 2016

Attacks on Software Publishing Infrastructure

5% of SySAdmin accounts or their laptops may be compromised at any moment


Ask dave

From the recent news:

"Juniper said that someone managed to get into its systems and write "unauthorized code" that "could allow a knowledgeable attacker to gain administrative access."

"LANDESK has found remnants of text files with lists of source code and build servers that the attackers compiled," John said. "They know for a fact that the attackers have been slowly [archiving] data from the build and source code servers, uploading it to LANDESK's web servers, and downloading it."

Infestation & Lateral Movement






- 1. User desktop infected WCE or Mimikatz is started
- 2. Privileged user or Application logs in WCE hijacks credentials
- 3. Rootkit remotely installed on server in datacenter
- 4. Super user performs task on datacenter server, malware hijacks credentials
- 5. Malware spreads throughout datacenter

- Targeting older software (Flash, Word, Acrobat Reader, Java)
- Malware customized to avoid AV signatures
- Higher they get the more unique the malware

Infestation Abuses Applied Software Publishing Infrastructure



Windows Detection Capabilities

AGENDA



"I'm no expert, but I think it's some kind of cyber attack!"

- Scope & References
- Why Another Audit Document
- Auditing Quick Overview
- Need For A Partnered Approach.
- Review Auditing & Associated Events.
- Review Registry Auditing.
- Dashboard & Queries.
- Next Steps.


SCOPE & REFERENCES

- Focus Is On Windows 2008 (& Newer) systems.
- More Details: iislam@cisco.com

WHY ANOTHER AUDIT DOCUMENT

- Red Team Lessons Learnt.
- Audit Category/Sub Category <> Event ID Mapping

AUDITING QUICK OVERVIEW




NEED FOR A PARTNERED APPROACH

- Increasing Number Of Systems & Applications.
- Security Teams Limited Ops Awareness
- Ops Teams Limited Security Awareness.
- Raise Security Awareness!



- Open GPMC Audit Policy



- Once Done...
- It Should Look Something Like.


65.	Select Administr	ator: Command Pro	mpt	 o x
licrosoft Windo	ows [Version 6.3.9600] soft Corporation. All ri	abts reserved		
System audit po	cem32>auditpol /get /Cat blicy cegory	egory:*		
ategory/Subcat	regory	Setting		
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Security Syst System Integr IPsec Driver Other System	rity	Success and	Failure	
Other Susten	Fuents	No Huditing	Failuse	
Security Stat	e Change	Success and	Failure	
ogon∕Logoff				
Logon Logoff		Success and Success and No Auditing	Failure	
Account Lock	out	No Auditing		
IPsec Main Mo	ode	No Auditing No Auditing		
Account Lock IPsec Main Mo IPsec Quick M IPsec Extende	node node	No Auditing		
		No Auditing Success and Success and	Failure	
Other Logon/1	logoff Events	Success and	Failure	
User / Device	Glaims	No Auditing		
bject Access	, status	no naarozny		
Registry		Success and	Failure	
		N= A.1141-9		
SAM Certification	Services	No Auditing No Auditing		
Application (Generated	Success and	Failure	
Handle Manipu	lation	No Auditing	P. 41	
Filtering Pla	Atform Packet Drop Atform Connection Access Events - Share	Success and No Auditing No Auditing	raiiure	
Filtering Pla	atform Connection	No Auditing		
Other Object	Access Events		Failure	
Removable Str	Page	No Auditing No Auditing		
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Other Privile Sensitive Pri Detailed Track:	age Use Events	No Auditing		
Sensitive Pr	ivilege Use	No Auditing		
Detailed Track:	lng	Success and	Failung	
Process Creat Process Term	ination	Failure	raiiure	
DPAPI Activit	. y	No Auditing		
RPC Events olicy Change		No Auditing		
Authenticatio	on Policy Change	Success		
Authorization	Policy Change	Success		
MPSSUC Rule-I	Level Policy Change	Success		
Other Policy	on Policy Change n Policy Change Level Policy Change ttform Policy Change Change Events Change Ponts	No Auditing No Auditing		
Audit Policy	Change	Success and	Failure	
Iccount Manager User Account	Management	Success and	Failung	
Computer Acco	nanagement	Success and	Failure	
Security Grou	nanagement up Management Group Management Sroup Management Hanagement Events	Success and Success and Success and Success and Success and	Failure	
Distribution	Group Management	Success and	Failure	
Other Account	-roup nanagement Management Events	Success and Success and	Failure	
Directory Sei	vice Changes	No Auditing		
Detailed Dire	sctory Service Renlication	on No Auditing		
Directory Sei	wice Changes wice Replication octory Service Replication wice Access	No Auditing		
iccount Logon	vice Ticket Openations	Success and	Pad luna	
Other Account	Logon Events	Success and Success	rallupe	
Kerberos Autl	entication Service	Success and	Failure	
Credential Va	alidation	Success and	Failure	
C:\Windows\syst	em32>			

CATEGORY	SUBCATEGORY	MEMBER SERVER SETTING	DOMAIN CONTROLLER SETTING	EVENTS TO MONITOR
System				
÷	Security System Extension	Success	Success and Failure	4611 (trusted logon - <u>runas</u>) 4697 (service installation)
	System Integrity	Success and Failure	Success and Failure	5038 (code integrity - hash of file is invalid)
-	IPsec Driver	No Auditing	No Auditing	4961 (IPsec dropped an inbound packet failed a replay check. It could indicate a replay attack against this computer) 4962 (IPsec dropped an inbound packet failed replay check. Too low a sequence number to ensure it was not a replay)
	Other System Events	Success	Success and Failure	5024 (firewall started) 5025 (firewall stopped) 5030 (firewall failed to start)
	Security State Change	Success and Failure	Success and Pailure	5030 (firewall failed to start)4608 (system shutdown)4616 (time change)4624 (logon success)4625 (logon fail)
Logon/Logoff				
	Logon	Success and Failure	Success and Failure	4624 (logon success) 4625 (logonfail) 4625 (logonfail) 4648 (explicit credentials- using for example curas) 4647 (user logoff) 4647 (user logoff) 4647 (user logoff) 4647 (user logoff)
•	Logoff	Success and Failure	Success and Failure	4647 (user logoff) 4634 (account logoff) - ASSOCIATED EVENTS
	Account Lockout	No Auditing	No Auditing	
	IPsec Main Mode	No Auditing	No Auditing	4666 (IKE Dos-prevention mode started.) 4650 (An IPsec security association was established. Certificate auth was not used.) 4651 (An IPsec main mode security association was established. Cert used for auth.) 4652 (An IPsec main mode negotiation failed.) 4653 (An IPsec main mode security association ended.) 4976 (During main mode negotiation, IPsec received an invalid negotiation packet. If this problem persists, it could indicate a network issue or an attempt to modify or replay this negotiation. 5049 (An IPsec Policy Agent applied Active Directory storage IPsec policy on the computer.)
	IPsec Quick Mode	No Auditing	No Auditing	4654 (An IPsec quick mode negotiation failed.) 4977 (During quick mode negotiation, IPsec received an invalid negotiation packet. If this problem persists, it could indicate a network issue or an attempt to modify or replay this negotiation.) 5451 (An IPsec quick mode security association was established.) 5452 (An IPsec quick mode security association ended.)
	IPsec Extended Mode	No Auditing	No Auditing	4978 (During extended mode negotiation, IPsec received an invalid negotiation packet.) 4979 (IPsec main mode and extended mode security associations were established.) 4980 (IPsec main mode and extended mode security associations were established.)

REVIEW REGISTRY AUDITING

1. "Object Access" Audit.

2. Enable SACL (audit)



File System

Registry

AD SERVERS ~258 Hosts* ~587 Million Event ~142GB Storage


WINDOWS SERVERS ~4500 Hosts ~171 Million Event ~44GB Storage


Search Pivot Reports Alets Dashboards Search & Reporting											
index≖ad earliest=-24h stats count BY sourcetype	Last 15 minutes ~ Q										
✓ 587,670,073 events (5/16/16 7:24:07.000 AM to 5/17/16 7:24:09.201 AM) ④ Job ∨ 11 ■	🔿 🛓 💩 🕴 Fast Mode 🗸										
Events Patterns Statistics (6) Visualization											
100 Per Page V Format V Preview V											
sourcetype 0	count 🗸										
WinEventLog:Security	578885965										
WinEventLog:Directory Service	4230476										
WinEventLog:Application	4110657										
WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker/MSI and Script	271310										
WinEventLog(System	171488										
WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker/EXE and DLL	177										

Search Pivot Reports Alerts Dashboards	Sear	ch & Reporting
index=windows earliest=-24h stats count by sourcetype		All time ~ Q
171,400,290 events (before 5/17/16 7:46:57:806 AM)	🚯 Job 🗸 🔲 🔲 🤌 🛓 🍓	🕈 Fast Mode 🗸
Events Patterns Statistics (4) Visualization		
100 Per Page 🗸 Format 🗸 Preview 🗸		
sourcetype 0		count 🗸
WinEventLog:Security		157619140
WinEventLog:Application		10123823
WinEventLog:System		3657323
Data Collection: 24 H	our Perio	od 4

DASHBOARD & QUERIES

- Dashboards
- Key Differences:
 - Drop Down Selection Boxes.
 - Admin Accounts/Privileged Groups
- Standard Operational View.
- Change "Index" For Queries
- Tags & Macros
 - - Remove Known Good Behaviour
- Due To Time Windows Only





DASHBOARD & QUERIES

- Event Summary By Task Category
- Event Summary By Host
- Host Support Details
- System Shutdown & Restart
- Local Security Group Change Monitoring
- Authorizations
 - Successful Authorizations
 - Successful Authorizations Grouped By User
 - Failed Authorizations
 - Failed Authorizations Grouped By User
- MSI Package Installations
- Suspect PowerShell Commands
- Process Execution Monitored Commands


- Process Execution
 - Most Common
 - Least Common
- Process Tracking By User
- New Service Installations
- Suspicious Services
- Registry Persistence Key Monitoring
- Scheduled Task Monitoring
- Firewall Change Monitoring
- Application Crashes
- Shares Remotely Accessed
- Local Account Password Changes.

DASHBOARD & QUERIES - EVENT SUMMARIES

- Event Category Activity Spikes Over Time
- Cross Reference To System/s Responsible

\$field2\$ | search index=win | timechart
count(EventCode) by TaskCategory

\$field2\$ | index=win | eval host=lower(host) |
chart count over host by TaskCategory



DASHBOARD & QUERIES – Authorizations

- Show Log On Activity To Service Grouped By User

index=win source=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4624 | eval "Activity Time"=(_time) | eval User=mvindex(Account_Name,1) | eval User_Domain=mvindex(Account_Domain,1) | eval User_Domain=lower(User_Domain) | eval Status=lower(Status) | eval ComputerName=upper(ComputerName) | eval Workstation_Name=upper(Workstation_Name) | search NOT ((Status=oxcoooo6d Sub_Status=oxcooo321) OR (User=*\$) OR (User_Domain="nt authority")) | lookup logon_types_explained.csv Logon_Type as Logon_Type output Status_Description AS SubStatus_Message | lookup Windows_Event_Status_Codes.csv Error_Code as Status output Error_Message AS Status_Message | lookup Windows_Event_Status_Codes.csv Error_Code as Sub_Status output Status_Description AS SubStatus_Message | rename Workstation_Name AS Source_ComputerName AS Destination_Computer, Caller_Process_Name AS Process_Name, Source_Network_Address AS Originating_Source_IP | transaction mvlist=t User | table "Activity Time" User User_Domain Originating_Source_IP Computer Process_Name AS Process_Name AS Process_Name AS Process_Name AS Process_Name Status_Message SubStatus_Message | convert timeformat="%m/%d/%Y %H:%M:%S %Z" ctime("Activity Time") | sort -_time

SUCCESSFUL AUTHOR	SUCCESSFUL AUTHORIZATION ACTIVITY GROUPED BY USERNAME														
Activity Time 0	User 0	User_Domain ≎	Originating_Source_IP ©	Source_Computer 0	Destination_Computer 0	Process_Name 0	Keywords 0	EventCode 0	Logon_Summary 0						
05/23/2016 04:47:43 CDT	iislam	cisco	10.228.24.45	NULL	MEM1-LAB1-V1.CISC0.COM	NULL	Audit Success	4624	N etwork						
05/23/2016 05:05:39 CDT	iislam	cisco	10.228.24.45	NULL	MEM1-LAB1-V2.CISC0.COM		Audit Success	4624	N etwork						
05/23/2016 01:10:05 CDT	DefaultAppPool	iis apppool	-	NULL	MEM1-LAB1-V1.CISC0.COM	NULL	Audit Success	4624	Service						
05/23/2016 02:13:36 CDT	DefaultAppPool	iis apppool		NULL	MEM1-LAB1-V1.CISC0.COM	NULL	Audit Success	4624	Service						
05/23/2016 02:33:42 CDT	DefaultAppPool	iis apppool		NULL	MEM1-LAB1-V1.CISC0.COM	NULL	Audit Success	4624	Service						
05/23/2016 00:08:28 CDT 05/23/2016 00:08:31 CDT 05/23/2016 00:08:34 CDT 05/23/2016 00:03:34 CDT 05/23/2016 01:19:54 CDT 05/23/2016 01:19:54 CDT 05/23/2016 01:20:38 CDT 05/23/2016 02:19:10 CDT 05/23/2016 02:19:10 CDT 05/23/2016 02:19:10 CDT 05/23/2016 02:19:10 CDT 05/23/2016 02:19:10 CDT 05/23/2016 02:19:21 CDT 05/23/2016 03:03:05 CDT 05/23/2016 03:03:08 CDT 05/23/2016 03:03:08 CDT 05/23/2016 03:04:08 CDT 05/23/2016 04:04 CDT 05/23/2016 04:08 CDT 05/23/2016 04	Administrator Administrator Administrator Administrator Administrator Administrator Administrator Administrator Administrator Administrator Administrator Administrator Administrator Administrator Administrator Administrator	mem14ab1-v1 mem14ab1-v1 mem14ab1-v2 mem14ab1-v2 mem14ab1-v2 mem14ab1-v2 mem14ab1-v2 mem14ab1-v2 mem14ab1-v1 mem14ab1-v1 mem14ab1-v1 mem14ab1-v1 mem14ab1-v1 mem14ab1-v1	72.163.195.193 173.38.82.94 72.163.195.193 173.38.82.94 72.163.195.193 72.163.195.193 72.163.195.193 72.163.195.193	R05APC-002-P R05APC-002-P R05APC-002-P MEM1-LAB1-V1 R05APC-002-P MEM1-LAB1-V1 R05APC-002-P R05AP	MEM 1-LAB 1-V1. CISCO.COM MEM 1-LAB 1-V1. CISCO.COM MEM 1-LAB 1-V1. CISCO.COM MEM 1-LAB 1-V2. CISCO.COM MEM 1-LAB 1-V2. CISCO.COM MEM 1-LAB 1-V1. CISCO	NULL NULL NULL NULL NULL NULL NULL NULL	Audit Success Audit Success	4624 4624 4624 4624 4624 4624 4624 4624	N etwork N etwork Pemote Interactive N etwork N etwork N etwork Remote Interactive N etwork Remote Interactive N etwork Remote Interactive N etwork N etwork N etwork N etwork						
05/23/2016 04:49:44 CDT	Administrator	mem1-lab1-v1	10.65.86.186	MPRAS-WIN8	MEM1-LAB1-V1.CISCO.COM	NULL	Audit Success	4624	Network						
05/23/2016 05:06:40 CDT	Administrator	mem1-lab1-v2	10.228.24.45	IISLAM-W702	MEM1-LAB1-V2.CISCO.COM	NULL	Audit Success	4624	Network						
05/23/2016 05:14:32 CDT	Administrator	mem1-lab1-v2	173.38.82.94	MEM1-LAB1-V1	MEM1-LAB1-V2.CISCO.COM	NULL	Audit Success	4624	Network						
05/23/2016 00:03:06 CDT	Empire_test	mem1-lab1-v1	-	RDS-APC-002-P	MEM1-LAB1-V1.CISC0.C0M	NULL	Audit Success	4624	Network						
05/23/2016 00:03:09 CDT	Empire_test	mem1-lab1-v1	-	RDS-APC-002-P	MEM1-LAB1-V1.CISC0.C0M	NULL	Audit Success	4624	Network						
05/23/2016 00:03:32 CDT	Empire_test	mem1-lab1-v1	72.163.195.193	MEM1-LAB1-V1	MEM1-LAB1-V1.CISC0.C0M	NULL	Audit Success	4624	Remote Interactive						
0510010016 00 01 16 00 7							1	1001	All shares and a						

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DASHBOARD & QUERIES - SUSPECT POWERSHELL ACTIVITY

- Suspect PowerShell Commands

- Identify Bypass, Hidden or Encoded Command Lines

index=win EventCode=4688 powershell.exe (unrestricted OR bypass OR hidden OR Enc OR encodecommand) NOT `power_shell_macro` | eval User=mvindex(Account_Name,o) | eval Activity_Time=(_time) | search NOT User=*\$ | decrypt f=PCL_Encoded_String atob emit('Decoded_Stager') | transaction host User mvlist=t | table Activity_Time User host Creator_Process_Name New_Process_Name Process_Command_Line Decoded_Stager | convert timeformat="%m/%d/%Y %H:%M:%S %Z" ctime(Activity_Time)

Events Patterns	Statistics (1	1) Visualiz	ation		
100 Per Page → Form	mat 🗸 🛛 Previ	ew 🗸			
Activity_Time 0	User 0	host 0	New_Process_Name 0	Process_Command_Line 0	
05/23/2016 04:25:18 CDT	Administrator	MEM1-Lab1-V1	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	powershell.exe executionpolicy unrestricted	
05/23/2016 04:25:32 CDT	Administrator	MEM1-Lab1-V1	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	powershell.exe-scope executionpolicy unrestricted	
05/23/2016 04:26:52 CDT	Administrator	MEM1-Lab1-V1	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	powershell.exe -Executionpolicy bypass	
05/23/2016 08:11:00 CDT	Administrator	MEM1-Lab1-V1	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	powershell.exe Executionpolicy bypass	
05/23/2016 08:11:17 CDT	Administrator	MEM1-Lab1-V1	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	powershell.exe -Executionpolicy bypass	
05/23/2016 08:11:45 CDT	Administrator	MEM1-Lab1-V1	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	powershell.exe -Executionpolicy Unrestricted	
05/23/2016 08:15:09 CDT	Administrator	MEM1-Lab1-V1	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"-NoP-Nonl	
05/23/2016 08:15:17 CDT	Administrator	MEM1-Lab1-V1	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	powershell.exe -NoP -NonI -W Hidden -Enc JAB3AEMAPQB0AGUAdwAtAE8AY	
05/23/2016 08:16:05 CDT	Administrator	MEM1-Lab1-V1	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -NoP -Non	
•				•	
				N.T. 61; WOW54; Trident/70; rv:110) like Gecko';\$WC.HEAd. N.T. 61; WOW54; Trident/70; rv:110) like Gecko';\$WC.HEAD	
	•				
				© 2016 Ciase and/or its offiliates. All rights recorrised. Ciase Car	afidantial 24

- Identify Admin Commands Being Run

- Only List If 4 Or More Unique Commands Have Been Run
- Leveraging sub searches & Lookup Tables

index=win source=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4688 NOT `proc_mon_macro` [search index=win source=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4688 NOT `proc_mon_macro` | rex field=New_Process_Name "(?P<Process_Name>[^\\\]+)\$" | search [|inputlookup suspect_proc_mon.csv | fields + Process_Name] | stats Values(New_Process_Name), dc(New_Process_Name) AS New_Process_Count BY ComputerName | where (New_Process_Count >=4) | fields + ComputerName] | rex field=New_Process_Name "(?P<Process_Name>[^\\\]+)\$" | search [|inputlookup suspect_proc_mon.csv | fields + Process_Name] | dedup ComputerName New_Process_Name Process_Command_Line | eval Activity_Time=(_time) | transaction ComputerName mvlist=t | table Activity_Time, ComputerName, Account_Domain, Account_Name, Logon_ID, Process_Name, New_Process_Name, Process_Command_Line Token_Elevation_Type eventcount | convert timeformat="%m/%d/%Y %H:%M:%S %Z" ctime(Activity_Time)

`proc_mon_macro`

power_shell_macro Advanced search » Search macros » power_shell_macro

Definition *

Enter the string the search macro expands to when it is referenced in another search. If arguments are included, enclose them in dollar signs. For example: \$arg1\$

((host=a89-* Account_Name=test Process_Command_Line=*tmp\\mailer-*.psl*) OR (host=a65-* Account_Name=atest "ad-ops\\monitoring\\"))

Use eval-based definition?

Arguments

- Commands Being Looked For.

inputlookup_suspect_proc_mon.csv	All time ~ Q
✓ 0 events (before 5/23/16 8:25:03.000 AM) Job ✓ 11 ■ → 🛓 🎂	🛡 Verbose Mode 🗸
Events Patterns Statistics (56) Visualization	
100 Per Page 🗸 Format 🗸 Preview 🗸	
Description 0	Process_Name 0
Displays and modifies the IP-to-Physical address translation tables used by address resolution protocol (ARP).	arp.exe
Job Scheduler	at.exe
Show What Is Set To AutoRun	autorunsc.exe
Windows Script.	cscript.exe
LDAP Extraction.	csvde.exe
Domain Controller Diagnostics.	dcdiag.exe
Searches For Text String In A File Or Files.	find.exe
Group Policy Editor	gpedit.exe
File Permissions	icacls.exe
LDAP Extraction.	ldifde.exe
LDAP Browser.	ldp.exe
Show DLL's In Use by Process	listdlis.exe
Parse Event Logs	logparser.exe
Credentials Stealer.	mimikatz.exe
Show System Information.	msinfo32.exe

- If 4 Or More Unique Commands Ran.
- Show Results Of Each Command & Command Line Together With User & Time.

PROCESS EXECUTION	- MONITORED COMM	ANDS					Q., 🖽 🗸
Activity_Time 0	ComputerName 0	Account_Domain 0	Account_Name 0	Logon_ID 0	Process_Name 0	New_Process_Name 0	Process_Command_Line 0
05/23/2016 02:01:17 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x86aa6	nbtstat.exe	C:\Windows\System32\nbtstat.exe	nbtstat
05/23/2016 02:01:24 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x86aa6	nbtstat.exe	C:\Windows\System32\nbtstat.exe	nbtstat -a
05/23/2016 02:01:26 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x86aa6	nbtstat.exe	C:\Windows\System32\nbtstat.exe	nbtstat - A
05/23/2016 02:02:20 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x86aa6	whoami.exe	C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe	whoami /?
05/23/2016 02:24:14 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x7aca0	net.exe	C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	net user TestUser1 Dartb0ard01! / ADD
05/23/2016 02:24:24 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x7aca0	net.exe	C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	net localgroup administrators TestUser1 /add
05/23/2016 02:27:39 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x7aca0	reg.exe	C:\Windows\System32\reg.exe	reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SusSer" /v ImagePath /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d \temp\evil.exe /f
05/23/2016 02:27:44 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x7aca0	reg.exe	C:\Windows\System32\reg.exe	reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SusSer" /f
05/23/2016 02:27:49 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x7aca0	reg.exe	C:\Windows\System32\reg.exe	reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v EvilKey /t REG_SZ /d "C:\flats\Evil\Binary.exe" /f 👘
05/23/2016 02:27:54 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x7aca0	reg.exe	C:\Windows\System32\reg.exe	reg delete "HKEY_L0CAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v EvilKey /f
05/23/2016 02:28:44 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x7aca0	NETSTAT.EXE	C:\Windows\System32\NETSTAT.EXE	netstat -ano
05/23/2016 02:28:44 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x7aca0	nbtstat.exe	C:\Windows\System32\nbtstat.exe	nbtstat -n
05/23/2016 02:28:44 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x7aca0	tasklist.exe	C:\Windows\System32\tasklist.exe	tasklist /v
05/23/2016 02:28:45 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x7aca0	whoami.exe	C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe	whoami
05/23/2016 02:28:45 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x7aca0	whoami.exe	C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe	whoami/groups
05/23/2016 02:28:45 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x7aca0	whoami.exe	C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe	whoami /user /groups
05/23/2016 02:29:00 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x7aca0	net.exe	C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	net use m: \\adc-lab1-v1-1\c\$ /user.vtech\administrator Dartb0ard
05/23/2016 02:29:17 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x7aca0	net.exe	C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	net use n: \\ado-lab1-v1-2\c\$ /user:vtech\administrator Dartb0ard
05/23/2016 02:29:22 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x7aca0	net.exe	C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	net use */delete /y
05/23/2016 02:29:27 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x7aca0	net.exe	C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	net user TestUser1 P@ssw0rd01!
05/23/2016 02:29:32 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	MEM1-LAB1-V1	Administrator	0x7aca0	net.exe	C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	net localgroup administrators TestUser1 /delete
05/23/2016 02:29:38 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	CISCO	MEM1-LAB1-V1\$	0x3e7	reg.exe	C:\Windows\System32\reg.exe	reg.exe delete HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Netmon3 /f
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DASHBOARD & QUERIES - PROCESS TRACKING BY USER

Show Who Is Running What...

index=win source=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4688 NOT ("NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM" OR Account_Name=*\$) | eval PID=tonumber(New_Process_ID, 16) | eval PPID=tonumber(Creator_Process_ID, 16) | eval "Activity Time"=(_time) | transaction ComputerName Account_Name Account_Domain mvlist=t keepevicted=true | table "Activity Time", ComputerName,Security_ID Account_Name, Logon_ID, Account_Domain, PID, New_Process_Name, Process_Command_Line, Token_Elevation_Type, PPID | convert timeformat="%m/%d/%Y %H:%M:%S %Z" ctime("Activity Time") | sort Account_Name -"Activity Time"

Activity Time 0	ComputerName 0	Security_ID 0	Account_Name 0	Logon_ID ©	Account_Domain 0	PID 0	New_Process_Name 0	Process_Command_Line 0
05/23/2016 00:34:14 CDT	mem1-lab1-v2.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-2487262911-4043373714-2844659958-500	Administrator	0x31cae48b	MEM1-LAB1-V2	3644	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	*C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe*
05/23/2016 00:34:26 CDT	mem1-lab1-v2.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-2487262911-4043373714-2844659958-500	Administrator	0x31cae48b	MEM1-LAB1-V2	3788	C:\Windows\System32\ipconfig.exe	ipconfig /all
05/23/2016 00:34:32 CDT	mem1-lab1-v2.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-2487262911-4043373714-2844659958-500	Administrator	0x31cae48b	MEM1-LAB1-V2	148	C:\Windows\System32\ipconfig.exe	ipconfig
05/23/2016 00:34:42 CDT	mem1-lab1-v2.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-2487262911-4043373714-2844659958-500	Administrator	0x31cae48b	MEM1-LAB1-V2	2296	C:\Windows\System32\PING.EXE	ping 173.36.54.1
05/23/2016 00:34:48 CDT	mem1-lab1-v2.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-2487262911-4043373714-2844659958-500	Administrator	0x31cae48b	MEM1-LAB1-V2	2856	C:\Windows\System32\PING.EXE	ping imp-rtp-002-p
05/23/2016 00:34:57 CDT	mem1-lab1-v2.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-2487262911-4043373714-2844659958-500	Administrator	0x31cae48b	MEM1-LAB1-V2	4828	C:\Windows\System32\mmc.exe	"C:\Windows\system32\mmc.exe" "C:\Windows\system32\wf.msc"
05/23/2016 00:35:25 CDT	mem1-lab1-v2.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-2487262911-4043373714-2844659958-500	Administrator	0x31cae48b	MEM1-LAB1-V2	5000	C:\Windows\System32\control.exe	*C:\Windows\System32\control.exe* SYSTEM
05/23/2016 00:08:37 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-70706661-469265944-129554908-500	Administrator	0x1ba2c83	MEM1-LAB1-V1	6088	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office15\msoia.exe	*C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office15\msola.exe* scan upload
05/23/2016 00:08:37 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-70706661-469265944-129554908-500	Administrator	0x1ba2c83	MEM1-LAB1-V1	5652	C:\Windows\explore.exe	C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
05/23/2016 00:08:39 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-70706661-469265944-129554908-500	Administrator	0x1ba2c83	MEM1-LAB1-V1	5720	C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\VMwareTray.exe	C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\VMwareTray.exe*
05/23/2016 00:08:39 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-70706661-469265944-129554908-500	Administrator	0x1ba2c83	MEM1-LAB1-V1	992	C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\VMwareUser.exe	C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\VMwareUser.exe*
05/23/2016 00:08:39 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-70706661-469265944-129554908-500	Administrator	0x1ba2c83	MEM1-LAB1-V1	5584	C:\Program Files\McAfee\Host Intrusion Prevention\FireTray.exe	C\Program Files\McAfee\Host Intrusion Prevention\FireTray.exe
05/23/2016 00:08:39 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-70706661-469265944-129554908-500	Administrator	0x1ba2c83	MEM1-LAB1-V1	640	C:\Windows\SysW0W64\runonce.exe	C:\Windows\SysW0W64\runonce.exe/Run6432
05/23/2016 00:08:39 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-70706661-469265944-129554908-500	Administrator	0x1ba2c83	MEM1-LAB1-V1	4528	C:\Program Files (x86)\SSH Communications Security\SSH Tectia\SSH Tectia AUX\Support binaries\ssh-broker-gui.exe	C:\Program Files (x86)\SSH Communications Security\SSH Tectia\SSH Tec
05/23/2016 00:08:39 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-70706661-469265944-129554908-500	Administrator	0x1ba2c83	MEM1-LAB1-V1	4352	C:\Program Files (x86)\SSH Communications Security\SSH Tectia\SSH Tectia AUX\Support binaries\ssh-broker-gui.exe	C:\Program Files (x86)\SSH Communications Security\SSH Tectia\SSH Tec
05/23/2016 00:08:39 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-70706661-469265944-129554908-500	Administrator	0x1ba2c83	MEM1-LAB1-V1	5320	C:\Program Files (x86)\McAfee\VirusScan Enterprise\shstat.exe	"C:\Program Files (x86)\McAfee\VirusScan Enterprise\shstat.exe" /STANDA
05/23/2016 00:08:39 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-70706661-469265944-129554908-500	Administrator	0x1ba2c83	MEM1-LAB1-V1	5368	C:\Program Files (x86)\McAfee\Common Framework\UdaterUl.exe	*C:\Program Files (x86)\McAfee\Common Framework\UdaterUl.exe* /Starte
05/23/2016 00:08:39 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-70706661-469265944-129554908-500	Administrator	0x1ba2c83	MEM1-LAB1-V1	5516	C:\Program Files (x86)\SSH Communications Security\SSH Tectia\SSH Tectia Broker\ssh-tectia-configuration.exe	"ssh-tectia-configuration.exe" cmd_convert
05/23/2016 00:08:44 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-70706661-469265944-129554908-500	Administrator	0x1ba2c83	MEM1-LAB1-V1	396	C:\Windows\System32\mmc.exe	*C:\Windows\system32\mmc.exe**C:\Windows\system32\ServerManager.r
05/23/2016 00:08:45 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-70706661-469265944-129554908-500	Administrator	0x1ba2c83	MEM1-LAB1-V1	4516	C:\Windows\System32\shutdown.exe	C:\Windows\system32\shutdown.exe-unexpected
05/23/2016 00:10:42 CDT	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	S-1-5-21-70706661-469265944-129554908-500	Administrator	0x1ba2c83	MEM1-LAB1-V1	6008	C:\Windows\explorer.exe	"C:\Windows\explorer.exe"

DASHBOARD & QUERIES – SUSPICIOUS SERVICES

Shows Us If The Service Executable/Driver Is Not In \SYSTEM32\

search index=windows source=WinEventLog:Security TaskCategory="Registry" EventCode=4657 Object_Name="\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*"
Object_Value_Name=ImagePath (Old_Value!=*system32* OR New_Value!=*system32*) | table _time Account_Name Account_Domain Logon_ID ComputerName EventCode
Process_Name Operation_Type Object_Name Old_Value_Type Old_Value New_Value_Type New_Value | sort -time

SUSPICIOUS SERVICES															
_time 0	Account_Name :	Account_Domain :	Logon_ID ©	ComputerName 0	EventCode 0	Process_Name 0	Operation_Type 0	Object_Name 0	Old_Value_Type 0	Old_Value 0	New_Value_Type 0	New_Value 0			
2016-05-24 04:29:20	Administrator	MEM1-LAB1-V1	0xcb758f	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	4657	C:\Windows\regedit.exe	Existing registry value modified	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\ADWS	REG_EXPAND_SZ	%systemroot%\ADWS\Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.WebServices.exe	REG_EXPAND_SZ	c:\windows\system32\1.exe			
2016-05-24 04:13:16	Administrator	MEM1-LAB1-V1	0xcb758f	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	4657	C:\Windows\regedit.exe	Existing registry value modified	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\ADWS	REG_EXPAND_SZ	%systemroot%\ADWS\Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.WebServices.exe	REG_EXPAND_SZ	c:\windows\temp\malicious.exe			
2016-05-24 04:13:59	Administrator	MEM1-LAB1-V1	0xcb758f	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	4657	C:\Windows\regedit.exe	Existing registry value modified	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\BITS	REG_EXPAND_SZ	%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs	REG_EXPAND_SZ	c:\temp\runme.exe			
2016-05-24 04:18:43	Administrator	MEM1-LAB1-V1	0xcb758f	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	4657	C:\Windows\regedit.exe	Existing registry value modified	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\BITS	REG_EXPAND_SZ	c:\temp\runme.exe	REG_EXPAND_SZ	%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs			
2016-05-24 04:19:15	Administrator	MEM1-LAB1-V1	0xcb758f	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	4657	C:\Windows\regedit.exe	Existing registry value modified	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\ADWS	REG_EXPAND_SZ	c:\windows\temp\malicious.exe	REG_EXPAND_SZ	%systemroot%\ADWS\Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.WebServ			
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DASHBOARD & QUERIES – REGISTRY PERSISTENCE KEY

- Identify Persistence Key Modifications.

index=windows source=WinEventLog:Security TaskCategory="Registry" EventCode=4657 NOT

(Object_Name="\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\ControlSetoo1\\services*") | table _time Account_Name Account_Domain ComputerName EventCode Process_Name Operation_Type Object_Name Old_Value New_Value | dedup Account_Name, ComputerName, Process_Name, Operation_Type, Object_Name, Old_Value, New_Value | rename Account_Name AS "User", Account_Domain AS "User Domain", Process_Name AS "Process Making Change", Operation_Type AS "Registry Operation", Object_Name AS "Registry Service Path", Old_Value AS "Old Registry Value", New_Value AS "New Registry Value"

REGISTRY PERSISTENCE	REGISTRY PERSISTENCE KEY MODIFICATION														
_time 0	User 0	User Domain 0	ComputerName 0	EventCode 0	Process Making Change 0	Registry Operation ©	Registry Service Path 0	Old Registry Value ः	New Registry Value 0						
2016-05-23 02:27:54	Administrator	MEM1-LAB1-V1	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	4657	C:\Windows\System32\reg.exe	Registry value deleted	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\S0FTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run	C:\flats\Evil\Binary.exe	-						
2016-05-23 02:07:31	Administrator	MEM1-LAB1-V1	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	4657	C:\Windows\System32\reg.exe	New registry value created	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\S0FTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run	-	C:\flats\Evil\Binary.exe						
2016-05-23 01:08:37	MEM1-LAB1-V1\$	CISCO	MEM1-Lab1-V1.cisco.com	4657	C:\Windows\System32\wininit.exe	Existing registry value modified	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\S0FTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon	39	5						

Registry Persistence

https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-1-introduction-attack-phases-and-windows-services https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order

DASHBOARD & QUERIES – SHARES ACCESSED

- Identify Shares Being Remotely Accessed

index=win EventCode=5140 NOT (Account_Name=*\$ OR Account_Name="ANONYMOUS LOGON" OR "SYSVOL" OR "IPC") | eval "Activity Time"=(_time) | transaction Source_Address mvlist=t | table "Activity Time" Account_Name Source_Address Account_Domain host Share_Name EventCode | convert timeformat="%m/%d/%Y %H:%M:%S %Z" ctime("Activity Time") | sort "Activity Time"

SHARES REMOTELY ACCESSED						
Activity Time 0	Account_Name 0	Source_Address 0	Account_Domain 0	host 0	Share_Name 0	EventCode 0
05/23/2016 01:22:38 CDT 05/23/2016 05:14:32 CDT	Administrator Administrator	173.38.82.94 173.38.82.94	MEM1-LAB1-V2 MEM1-LAB1-V2	mem 1-lab 1-v2 mem 1-lab 1-v2	*\C\$ *\C\$	5140 5140
05/23/2016 02:23:23 CDT	Administrator	127.0.0.1	MEM1-LAB1-V1	MEM1-Lab1-V1	*\C\$	5140
05/23/2016 04:47:46 CDT 05/23/2016 04:47:46 CDT 05/23/2016 04:47:46 CDT 05/23/2016 04:47:46 CDT 05/23/2016 04:48:18 CDT 05/23/2016 05:06:40 CDT	iislam iislam iislam Administrator Administrator	10.228.24.45 10.228.24.45 10.228.24.45 10.228.24.45 10.228.24.45 10.228.24.45	CISC0 CISC0 CISC0 MEM1-LAB1-V1 MEM1-LAB1-V2	MEM1-Lab1-V1 MEM1-Lab1-V1 MEM1-Lab1-V1 MEM1-Lab1-V1 mem1-lab1-V2	*\WSUSTemp *\WSusContent *\UpdateServicesPackages *\C\$ *\E\$	5140 5140 5140 5140 5140
05/23/2016 04:49:44 CDT	Administrator	10.65.86.186	MEM1-LAB1-V1	MEM1-Lab1-V1	*\C\$	5140
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NEXT STEPS

- POWERSHELL (version requirement)

- EXPLOIT TOOLS
 - <u>https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit</u>
 - <u>https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/tree/master/PowerUp</u>
 - <u>http://www.kitploit.com/2016/01/pownedshell-powershell-runspace-post.html</u>
 - <u>http://www.powertheshell.com/powershell-obfuscator/</u>
- LOGGING
 - https://www.petri.com/enable-powershell-logging
 - <u>https://logrhythm.com/blog/powershell-command-line-logging/</u>
- WMI
 - https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa826686%28v=vs.85%29.aspx

- SYSMON (FILE HASH)

- <u>https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/sysmon</u>
- FIREWALL
 - Audit Category: Object Access, Subcategory: Filtering Platform Connections (high event volume)

NEXT STEPS

- Useful Sources... (Thank You)

https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/Default.aspx http://eventopedia.cloudapp.net/Events/?/Operating+System/Microsoft+Windows https://helgeklein.com/download/ https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc731451.aspx https://www.404techsupport.com/2010/05/rsop-and-gpresult-must-know-tools-when-using-group-policy/ http://www.stigviewer.com/stig/windows_8_8.1/2014-04-02/finding/V-43239 http://www.computerstepbystep.com/turn-off-multicast-name-resolution.html https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/299656 https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc766341%28v=ws.10%29.aspx https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc766341%28v=ws.10%29.aspx

- Download "Windows Auditing Guide"

- Download: <u>https://cisco.box.com/v/15062016</u> (pwd: first_seoul)

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